Congressional Report on Pearl Harbor

1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty Officer from the Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT). It reported an attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor. Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer Patrol Wing TWO, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a sampan into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from the Navy Yard Signal Tower as follows: "Enemy Air Raid Not Drill." Almost simultaneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bombers were bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks on the ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods of intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820. Another period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers, a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and strafing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported in Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MONAGHAN. All enemy planes withdrew about 1000.

4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and examination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated in the raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of our Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate and destroy the enemy forces.

On the morning 7 Dec. Task Force 8 (ENTERPRISE, NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER, (Crudiv 5), DUNLAP, ELIOT, FANNING, BENHAM, GRIDLEY, MAURY, BALCH, (Desron 6) were returning to Pearl Harbor after completing mission vicinity Wake Island. From position approximately 215 miles West of Pearl routing scouting flight launched. Flight had orders to search ahead sector through 045-135° for distance 150 miles. Thence planes to proceed to Pearl. Three planes also launched to establish inner air patrol.

Patron 21 Midway: Patron 11, 12, 14, Kaneohoe; Patron 21, 22, 23, 24 Pearl Harbor. WRIGHT enroute from P. H. For Midway. Condition of readiness B-5. (50% aircraft on 4 hours notice). Specific duty assignments required 6 planes from Patron 14, 24, and 12 to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. Total number of planes ready for flight or in the air in 4 hours or less: 72. At time first bomb dropped 14 patrol aircraft were in the air (7 on search from Midway), 58 ready for flight in 4 hours or less. Nine undergoing repairs.

PATRON 11 Two planes in hangar 4 planes at south end of hangar 6 planes on ramp. As soon as raid started three rifles were manned immediately. Two machine guns manned in a plane being removed from the hangar. Machine gun position in plane abandoned and guns moved to a safer position. Set up 2 machine gun nests near south end of hangar. Damage received: 7 planes burned; one wrecked; and four damaged but can be repaired. All hangar, office equipment, and stores destroyed.

PATRON 12 Two planes moored in Kaneohe Bay, two in hangar and 8 on parking apron. Upon being attacked manned machine guns in planes, mounted machine guns in pits and used rifles. Observed second wave of horizontal bombers did not release bombs. Own losses 8 PBY-5's planes completely destroyed, two severely damaged, two moderately damaged, all hangar, office equipment and stores destroyed

PYRO Secured along West Loch dock, stbd. side to. Heard noise of low-flying aircraft and explosion in Navy Yard area. Observed two low wing monoplanes about 100 feet above water head for PYRO's port beam. Planes zoomed clear of ship and was observed to be Japanese. Sounded General Quarters and prepared to get underway.

TRACY Observed BBs attacked from astern by about 10 dive bombers. Torpedo planes at about 100 feet approached from Easterly direction attacking BBs. O. O. D. saw dive bombers attack BBs (10 planes and Ford Is. from North). Attack followed by horizontal and dive bombers on same objective plus ships in dry dock. 1 dive bomber passed close enough to observe that it was a single engine by-plane probably type 94.

BAGLEY Moored Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, berth B-22, repairs to starboard bilge keel. Sighted dive bombers in action over Hickam Field. They were believed at that time to be Army bombers. Shortly after this time enemy plane approached from the direction of Merry Point at about 30-40 feet altitude and dropped torpedo on OKLAHOMA and retired. Opened up with forward machine guns on attacking plane. Machine gun fire bagged 5th plane, it swerved and torpedo dropped and exploded in bank 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Plane finally downed in channel. Concluded machine gunning enemy planes. 3 planes believed to have been shot down by BAGLEY.

HENLEY Through error in gangway watch in calling crew to quarters for muster at 0755, General Alarm was sounded instead of gas alarm as customary. Observed first torpedo plane attack on UTAH. Crew proceeded to Battle Stations while General Alarm sounded the second time. Set material condition AFFIRM. Made preparations for getting underway. Opened file on light bomber. Altitude about 17,000 feet apparently steady on Northerly course; approaching from seaward and passing over Ford Island.

HONOLULU Moored port side to berth B21 Navy Yard Pearl with USS ST. LOUIS alongside stbd. side. Planes were seen diving on HICKAM FIELD. At the same time a wave of torpedo planes were seen approaching over fleet landing. Sounded general quarters and passed word "Enemy Air Raid". Ship prepared to get underway. A. A. batteries came into action gun by gun as they were manned. 50 caliber and 30 caliber M. G.'s fired on enemy torpedo planes attacking the BB's. From this time until raid ended 30 caliber, 50 caliber and 5"/25 A. A. guns fired at every available target. Service ammunition expended 2,800 rounds of 30 caliber, 4,500 of 50 caliber, 250 rounds of 5"/25 caliber.

MinDiv ONE Japanese planes were seen to attack the BB's. Men were sent to adjacent ships, NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO, and CUMMINGS, to assist in manning A.A. guns and handle ammunition. Meanwhile receiving barracks sent men (our) to other ships to assist in fighting fires or handling ammunition. These men reported to PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, and WHITNEY. Also in the Yard. Miner's Mates were sent to West Loch. 50 and 30 caliber MG's were reassembled and remounted and ammunition was obtained from

PATTERSON Moored at berth X-11, battle stations manned. Opened fire with main and 50 caliber batteries. The PATTERSON considered that at least one enemy plane was shot down. The plane claimed by PATTERSON was one observed diving on CURTISS approaching from ahead at about 400 ft. Altitude. Plane was seen to fall apart at same time shot was fired by #2 gun.

PREBLE On 7 December was undergoing Navy Yard overhaul at berth Z-15 with no ammunition on board and the engineering plant dismantled. First attack on battleships began with about 20 torpedo planes. Planes were in low horizontal flight when observed and attacked from eastward. Enemy planes approached battleships to close range before releasing torpedoes.

Both planes were successfully hoisted out by hand power. Doctor was directed to report to SOLACE. [11] Damage repair party was sent to capsized UTAH to cut men out of hull. Sent Signal to send pontoon and a lighter alongside from BALTIMORE to RALEIGH. These were delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as an out-rigger. Torpedoes, minus war heads were pushed overboard and beached at Ford Island. All stanchions, boat skids and life rafts and booms were jettisoned. Both anchors let go.

RAMAPO O. O. D. Observed Japanese dive bomber come in close and drop couple of bombs. Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with A.A. Guns (3"/). Motor Torpedo Boats on board also opened fire with machine guns. Order of attack observed to be dive bombers strafing, torpedo planes, dive bombers bombing, horizontal planes bombing. Our personnel reported 3" shell hit plane. No losses in personnel and no material damage.

SWAN Sounded General Quarters. In Marine Railway, boiler upkeep. Observed bomb dropped on South ramp of Fleet Air Base. TAUTOG Observed about 20 planes approaching on line of OAHU rail road tracks, and over Merry's point. Torpedoes were dropped from about 50 feet after submarine base pier was passed. Fourth plane in line and plane near end of line were shot down by this ship and HULBERT before torpedoes were dropped.

A Japanese plane flew from North to South over a fish pond adjacent to water front resident of Lt. R. B. Black, U. S. N. R. on the East shore of Pearl City Peninsula. A long burst of machine gun fire was directed at the breakwater enclosing the fish pond, and a single fisherman wearing a white shirt was seen to run rapidly along the breakwater. This material is forwarded to indicate that enemy pilots were directing fire at individuals (civilians) at a considerable distance from any military objectives.

WEST VIRGINIA Passed word "Away fire and rescue party" followed by General Quarters. Two heavy shocks felt on hull of W. VA. Apparently forward and on port side. Ship began to list rapidly to port. Another third heavy shock felt to port. Plane on top of turret 4 caught on fire. A heavy explosion occurred with about 20 list on ship to port. Central station directed to counterflood. The following last explosion flashed a flame about 15 feet high occurred forward on ARIZONA. A second flash occurred on the ARIZONA higher than the foretop. Burning debris rained on Quarter Deck of W. VA. After the 2 ARIZONA explosions the W. VA. began to right itself when a large fire broke out amidships. Word received from central station to abandon ship. A wall of flame advancing toward the W. VA. and TENNESSEE from the ARIZONA. W. VA. Personnel began to abandon ship as fire had grown out of control. Meanwhile magazines of W. VA. Had been flooded. W. VA. personnel report to TENNESSEE. Remaining survivors ashore and elsewhere sent back to W. VA. to fight fire. Fire on W. VA. extinguished Monday afternoon.

THORNTON Reports attack by Japanese Aircraft commenced; General Alarm was sounded and all hands went to Air Defense Stations. THORNTON moored port side to dock at Berth S-1, Submarine Base Pearl Harbor. Stations manned were as follows: Control, Machine Gun Battery Control, Repair, and 4 .50 cal. Machine Guns, 3 .30 Cal. Lewis Machine Guns, 3 .30 Browning automatic rifles, and 12 .30 cal. Springfield rifles.

PENNSYLVANIA In Dry Dock #1. 3 Propeller Shafts removed. Destroyers CASSIN and DOWNES in Dock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Floating Dock West of new dry dock adjoining PENNSYLVANIA occupied by SHAW. Cruiser HELENA and OGLALA at Berth B-2 (PENNSYLVANIA normal berth). CALIFORNIA in F-3. MARYLAND in F-4 inboard. OKLAHOMA outboard: Berth F-6, TENNESSEE inboard WEST VIRGINIA outboard, F7 ARIZONA, F8 NEVADA. Machine Guns in foremast manned and condition watch of A. A. personnel available. Ship receiving steam, water and power from yard. Heard explosions on end of Ford Island and realized an Air Raid in progress after 2nd explosion. Air defense sounded, followed by General Quarters. Set Condition YOKE.

ZANE ZANE moored bow and stern to nest with Mine Division FOUR at buoys D-7; order from port to starboard: TREVER, WASMUTH, ZANE and PERRY. First call to standby colors sounded, Signalmen on watch observed single Japanese plane drop bomb from about 10000 feet on southern end Ford Island after approach from Northward. Sounded General Quarters; manned A. A. battery. Commenced firing with A. A. battery at all planes passing within reasonable distances. Made all preparations to get underway.

BAGLEY BAGLEY observed Torpedo Plane come in from direction of Merry Point between Navy Yard and Kuahua Island, 30 or 40 feet altitude, headed for OKLAHOMA. About 2 or 3 hundred yards from OKLAHOMA, plane dropped its torpedo and hit OKLAHOMA amidships, sounded General Quarters and commenced firing. Hit fourth plane coming in which was seen to crash in channel off Officers' Club landing. Machine gun fire on 8th plane made it swerve to left causing torpedo to drop and explode in bank about 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Number one machine gun downed plane in Navy Yard channel. Third torpedo plane hit by BAGLEY was observed headed for light cruisers HONOLULU and ST. LOUIS astern of BAGLEY. Plane went out of control, dropped its torpedo and seemed to hit L-head Crane in Navy Yard. This was about the eleventh plane to come in. Next plane hit by BAGLEY came over dock but was downed with a short burst. Torpedo dropped in lumber pile and plane believed to have crashed on dock. Fifth plane brought down by BAGLEY came down on starboard side, nose directly up into air and spun into crash loosing its torpedo. Sixth plane brought down by BAGLEY was a dive bomber during second phase of attack and after torpedo attack. This plane was shot down by 5" gun and those from other ships.

MUGFORD Moored Port side to the USS SACRAMENTO, Berth No. 6, Navy Yard. USS JARVIS moored Port side to MUGFORD. Attack started. Japanese planes dive on Ford Island. Several large bombs struck the sea plane landing ramp followed by explosions near hangars. Several Japanese planes came in low from Southwest and released torpedoes which struck OKLAHOMA and WEST VIRGINIA. Enemy torpedo planes came in continuously from same direction and fired torpedoes at the Battleships.

TENNESSEE TENNESSEE attacked by enemy planes (Japanese). Oily water around stern burning. Canvas awning on stern on fire, Turret III. Smoke pouring into Repair I. Smoke so thick, cannot see. Repair I have men standby magazine flood, Turret III. All boats on fire. Fire in Maintop, secondary aft. Fire in maintop seems to be out. WEST VIRGINIA's quarterdeck and planes on fire. Fire on Turret III. Could not get morphine out of doctor's room because it was unsafe, men report that room was too hot to go in and cut safe open, D-310 excessively hot investigate. Squadron of planes diving on Navy Yard. Repair I, unit 3, abandoned station too hot. Fire on topside seems to be under control. D-310 A is all right. Set Condition ZED in lower handling room of Turret III. OKLAHOMA seems to be capsizing. CALIFORNIA down by the stern. WEST VIRGINIA has pretty bad fire below Signal Bridge. TENNESSEE was hit twice, soon after attack began: one hit (bomb) on face of Turret II, and bomb hit on top of Turret III, penetrating.

COMINBATFOR Comincraft in OGLALA observed enemy bomb fall seaward and Ford Island; no damage. The next bomb caused fires near waters. Flames flared up from structures south end of island. Next bomb fell alongside or on board 7 battleships moored at F-1 east side of Ford Island. Jap planes flew between fifty and l00 feet of water, dropping 3 torpedoes or mines in channel on line between OGLALA and seaward end of Ford Island. [20] Torpedo hit OGLALA and HELENA simultaneously. These ships were moored abreast of B-2 of ten ten dock OGLALA outboard. Both ships opened fire with A. A. battery. OGLALA signaled C-C possibility that mines had been dropped. Two contract tugs were hailed to haul OGLALA aft of HELENA. Submersible pumps for OGLALA were obtained from HELENA, but could not be used as no power was available. Observed one Jap plane shot down. Planes were strafing as well as bombing. Observed 4 battleships hit with bombs, fires broke out, and one battleship turned over. Enemy planes appeared to fly in groups of 6 to l0. NEVADA underway to clear channel, but apparently was struck by torpedo or mine. A minute later 2 bombs fell only one hit in the NEVADA. On 2nd attack observed bomb dropped on fwd part of PENNSYLVANIA in dry-dock. Flames appeared from two destroyers in the same dock. Observed another Jap plane fall in water. Observed

CASTOR CASTOR 3" A. A. and 30 cal. machine guns commenced firing against enemy torpedo planes, low and close aboard, and against dive bombers. Observed one enemy torpedo plane at about 500 to 700 yards range and 500 ft. altitude due aft of ship and heading across to Ford Island with parts of fuselage shot away. Plane grounded either on Ford Island or beyond. Removed covered lighter alongside with 450 serial depth charges.

HELM Torpedo planes sighted approaching from direction of Barber's Point. They passed over West Loch channel and dropped torpedoes either in North Channel or across the Island. Targets for these planes appeared to he ships in berths F-9 to F-13. The planes came in low and several strafed the ship. All bullets missed the ship by a few feet. No fire was opened, since the forward machine guns, which could bear were covered with preservative grease and had to be cleaned before they could fire.

JARVIS Ensign Greene OOD of JARVIS reported on bridge. Prior to this he had been directing activities around the quarterdeck. He was told to go to the after firing battery. Ensign Chiles was actively organizing the forward battery without orders. Ensign Fleece already on the director. Orders given to open fire.

RALEIGH Opened fire with AA battery of 3"/50 cal. 1.1" and .50 cal. guns. Ship started to heel to port and received report that torpedo had struck #2 fireroom. #1 and 2 firerooms and forward engineroom completely flooded. Fire in #3 went out. Directed counter-flooding. As it appeared that ship would capsize, orders were given to jettison topside.

RALEIGH Both planes successfully hoisted out by hand. Doctor was directed to report to SOLACE. Damage repair party was sent to capsized UTAH to cut men out of hull. Sent signal to send pontoons and lighter from alongside BALTIMORE to RALEIGH. These were delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as outrigger. Torpedoes minus warheads were beached at Ford Island. All stanchions, boat skids, and life rafts and booms were jettisoned. Anchors were let go.

UTAH Attacked by torpedo plane and bombing plane. Sounded General Quarters. Received severe underwater hit frame 84, portside, followed by another hit which caused ship to list 15 . Passed word "all hands on deck". Not possible to repel attack as all ammunition was in magazines and secured. 5" and 1.1 guns covered with steel housing; .50 and .30 caliber machine guns dismounted and stowed below decks. Ship covered with two layers 6 by 12 timbers. Above conditions necessitated by UTAH being used by ships as bombing target during current operations. Received bomb explosion in port aircastle.

SUMNER Saw dense smoke rising behind Kuahuai Peninsula believed from ARIZONA, blazing oil floating down from line of BBs. Opened fire #3 gun manned and commenced firing four minutes after the attack on Navy Yard was observed, and before any other gun in the vicinity had commenced firing. Made direct hit on and destroyed torpedo plane making approach on BBs.

HELENA Opened fire. Hit by torpedo, range 500 yds., starboard side, approximately frame 75, 18 feet below water line. Four near misses from bombs received and one strafing attack with little damage. Issued gas masks and protective clothing. Once gun opposition was in full swing, Japanese plans were noted to turn away from gunfire or keep at respectable altitude.

PENNA. Attack by Torpedo planes from west and south, about 12 or 15. PENNA. Reported as first ship opening fire on plane. After release of torpedoes three planes came in low from port beam strafing PENNA., though not affected. Bearing of torpedo attack and one enemy plane observed to burst into flame 2000 yds on stbd. bow. Dive bombing attacks and torpedo attacks on Pearl Harbor, and dive bombing attacks on Hickam Field.

VESTAL Struck by two bombs. VESTAL moored to port side of ARIZONA B-F7. One bomb struck stbd side fr. 44. Penetrated 3 decks, exploding in GSK stores, cutting fire main and electric cables in crew space. Hold set on fire and wrecked. Another bomb struck at fr. 110 on port side, passed through the ships and fuel oil tank. Bomb explosion forward damaged practically all stores. Heat of explosion necessitated flooding fwd magazines. Material damaged consisted of 3 life rafts, 6 mooring lines, one gangway, port lenses and windows broken.

Enemy aircraft bomb struck hangar and aircraft parking space adjacent to VP-24 parking area. Ready plane suffered a severed wing spar. Plane was then machine gunned and caught fire. Fire was extinguished and plane has been repaired and is in service. Plane undergoing structural changes not damaged and is now operating. Personnel present mounted machine guns in available planes and opened fire on attacking planes. One low-winged biplane flying from across hangar 54 on course about 250 lost both wings.

NEW ORLEANS All batteries NEW ORLEANS except 8" battery in action. Area around berths 14-19 incl. subjected to dive bombing attack by approximately ten enemy planes. Attack turned away by combined fire of HONOLULU and NEW ORLEANS. Observed three bombs drop: one falling ahead of and another falling astern of the RIGEL. These failed to explode. Third bomb landed midway between RIGEL and NEW ORLEANS exploding and causing damage from flying fragments. During raid yard power failed or was cut off leaving vessel in darkness without power except auxiliary battery power. Heavy drain of machinery raising steam for getting underway exhausted auxiliary batteries so much that lighting was very dim and of practically no use. All work in engineering spaces, magazines and ammunition passageways conducted by flashlight. Hoists and guns worked by hand with consequent reduction of volume of fire. AA directors were off ship.

RAIL At coal docks nested with 4 minesweeps. Opened fire with 3" A. A. 15 minutes after first bomb dropped on Pearl. Opened fire with .30 machine guns, rifles and pistols 20 minutes after first attack. A string of 20 bombs fell in channel astern. Shrapnel fell throughout ship. No material or personnel damage.

Task Force 8 received message from CinC Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill. This time about coincided with expected arrival ENTERPRISE planes at Pearl. Task Force Comdr. first concerned that planes were assumed to be unfriendly by harbor defenses. It was not until subsequent dispatches were received that it was realized hostilities with Japan had begun. TF-8 operated in area South Kaula Rock for air attack should enemy be located North or South of Oahu. No authentic information available regarding location. Maintained combat and inner air patrols.

Aircraft in flight informed hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl. VP-21 directed to search sector 240-280 for carriers. Ten miles south of Barbers Point plane 24VP-4 sighted unidentified submarine near force consisting of INDIANAPOLIS and 4 destroyers. Submarine made crash dive and spot marked by float lights. Completed search through 200 miles and returned to Pearl.

PENNA Reports NEVADA underway and about on PENNA stbd qtr. Distance about 600 yards when dive bombing attack observed approaching PENNA on port bow. 10 or 15 planes coming in succession just before reaching PENNA 2/3 planes appeared to swerve to left. Number of them dropping bombs at the NEV. 1 dive bomber dropped bomb on SHAW in floating dry dock and set it on fire. NEV observed to slowly swing around head to port broadside to channel, on fire forward.

RIGEL Undergoing major repairs and conversion at Navy Yard. No motive power available. All power etc. from yard. Air attack began. As this vessel had no armament no offensive action could be taken. Accordingly rescue work was commenced on WEST VIRGINIA personnel. About 100 men (in track of burning oil) had been blown into the water. These were rescued first. The torpedo bombing and machine gun [34] assaults on the WEST VIRGINIA continued while the rescue operations progressed. One rescue boat was struck by bomb and sunk. Crew thrown into water. Moored B-13 Navy Yard undergoing major repairs. Services from Navy Yard.

SUMNER Opened fire on ten dive bombers attacking Navy Yard Dry Dock. These planes approached from cloud bank in Southeast. Hear terrific explosion in Navy Yard-vicinity of Dry Dock followed by dense cloud of smoke. Dive bomber passed 300 yards from SUMNER and DD's HULBERT and THORNTON, tail of plane ignited. Plane turned southward and disappeared over Halawa district. Observed six horizontal bombers approaching from southeast at 8,000 feet. Planes circled and approached Ford Island from Southwest and dropped bombs over DD's. Planes then circled to Southeast. One plane left it's formation, turned towards Navy Yard loosing altitude rapidly, passed SUMNER at 400 feet altitude range 600 yards, was fired on by SUMNER. When over center Southeast Loch, plane began smoking and was lost in thick smoke over Navy Yard. It was a two-seater monoplane, gunner in rear seat protected by shield, orange disc on side just abaft rear cockpit.

BREESE Sighted conning towers of two submarines in North channel but could not open fire because of interior berth. Observed MONAGHAN proceed down channel at full speed to ram leading submarine which had just fired torpedo at USS CURTISS but missed, USS MONAGHAN dropped 2 depth charges and submarine, about 250 ton type arose upside down and sank.

HENLEY underway from buoy X-11, Large bomb struck water 150 yards from port bow. Received signal "submarine in harbor". MACDONOUGH directly ahead made depth charge attack and cleared at high speed. HENLEY was third ship in sortie. After rounding Hospital Point, subjected to strafing attack by light bomber, coming up from astern and showing five distinct sources of machine gun fire from plane as plane passed ship. It was seen to crash offshore in a few minutes. Another light bomber approached from starboard at 2,000 feet and was taken under fire with another destroyer. Close burst forces plane to dive and it crashed into sea.

BLUE Underway upon execution of signal to get underway from berth X-7. Maintained fire on enemy planes with main battery and machine guns while steaming out of harbor. Four planes fired on with main battery were later seen to go down in smoke. It is claimed that two of these planes were definitely shot down by this vessel. One was seen to crash in field on Waipio Pena., and the second crashed into crane on stern of USS CURTISS. Two planes that dove over the ship were fired on by the .50 caliber machine guns. It is claimed that one of these planes, seen to crash near Pan American Dock, was shot down by this vessel.

HONOLULU Enemy bomber sighted flying directly towards this ship from direction Merry Point with an altitude of 1,000 feet. Was seen to swerve to its left, pass over the Navy Yard, smoking, losing altitude and appeared to crash near Naval Hospital. This plane was under the fire of several ships. Including the port 5" and machine gun batteries of the HONOLULU. Damage to enemy observed, one torpedo plane shot down between berth 21, Submarine Base, one torpedo plane shot down between berth 21 BB. (Note: Damage listed above is at unknown times.)

TAUTOG Observed planes approaching in direction Hickam Field high in southwest and mostly obscured by clouds. App. 18 planes turned left over Hickam Field and made dive bombing attacks on ships in yard. Dive appeared slow and bombs released were very low. One plane observed out of control in flames. Scattered enemy planes observed until 1130. Most dive bombers appeared to drop two bombs each.

CALIFORNIA One bomb, possibly 15" projectile with tale vanes, struck CALIFORNIA abreast casemate one, frame 59, penetrated to second deck and exploded rupturing forward and after bulkheads of A-611 and overhead into A-705. Armored hatch to machine shop badly sprung and couldn't be closed, resulting in serious fire.

RALPH TALBOT Underway. While enroute to entrance expended 150 rounds 5"/38 cal. and 1500 rounds .50 cal. Observed two planes crash and another start to smoke badly. Two enemy planes dove low over bridge and was hit by our .50 cal. machine guns. Plane crashed along shore Pearl City abeam of us. Used after 5" guns to fire on plane attacking CURTISS.

BOBOLINK Observed three flights of high altitude bombers approaching from due south to north. 7 planes in each flight, altitude about 17,000 feet. One flight dropped bombs on Hickam, second flight passed directly over coal docks and dropped bombs further up in yard; third flight passed over West Loch, one plane dropping bombs near entrance while others maintained course and dropped them beyond Ford Island.

RALEIGH Dive bomber attack came in which was met with warm reception. One bomb hit ship a glancing blow going through carpenter shop and oil tank, piercing the skin below water line and finally detonating on bottom of harbor. Plane machine gunned ship also. Steam raised in 3 and 4 firerooms and pumps started. Five bombing planes under fire were observed to crash close aboard.

CURTISS Reports group of planes under heavy fire attacked. During attack one bomb hit stern mooring buoy. 1 fell short, one over one hit ship starboard side of boat deck, passed through Carpenter Shop and Radio Repair Shop, entered Hangar and detonated on Main Deck. Explosion destroyed bulk heads, deck. etc., within radius of 30 feet. Equipment destroyed in Hangar. Handling Room etc. One plane shot down 1000 yards on port bow and l 500 yards on port beam. Another plane shot on port beam landing in water off Pan-Air dock. One plane reported crashed in cane field astern and one forward of ship.

HELM Small enemy fighter approached ship from astern in medium glide and dropped two bombs, which exploded in water about 50 yards off port bow and 20 yards of starboard bow. After machine guns opened fire but did not hit plane. Shock shorted relay to steering (which had just been repaired) and damaged gyro rotor. Choke coils tubes and resistors in sound gear burned out, echo ranging inoperative. Seams below waterline on starboard side forward sprung. A-15, A-301 A-401, and A-402 flooded. These compartments closed off and pumped out during afternoon. FS smoke generators jumped track, breaking air line connection.

TRACY Commanding Officer returned aboard and found 2 .50 cal. mach. guns mounted and ready. 2 dive bombers attacked out of the sun. 1 plane pulling out over sub base and flying low over building 155 crashed in flames in vicinity of hospital point after salvo by CUMMINGS. Plane appeared to be a type 95 dive bomber, planes appeared to be at about 3,000 feet to seaward of Hickam, were 18 planes in formation type V.

PRUITT Observed low flying pursuit planes strafing with machine gun fire on ships moored in the vicinity of Berth 18. Observers on this ship believe many high altitude horizontal bombs either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor area where they could not be observed. An indeterminate number of fighters took part in the raid, with approximately 30 bombers. Approaches were made on a steady course and all horizontal bombing was made in close formation at about 10,000 feet. The four cruisers and light minelayers in the Navy Yard were strafed several times by low flying planes but not a single bomb appeared to have been aimed at those ships. Small caliber fire of minelayers brought down one Japanese plane.

TENNESSEE Reports wounded being removed from the WEST VIRGINIA. OKLAHOMA upside down. Bow blown away on ARIZONA. Destroyers getting underway on other side of Ford Island. Fire either on ARGONNE or dock. Air attack coming in on starboard bow. WEST VIRGINIA on fire from turret 1 to bow. Flames up as high as foretop. Fire on port quarter (oil on water).

PENNSYLVANIA Observed warheads on DOWNES explode covering area with debris. Section of torpedo tube, weighing about 1,000 lbs. Landed on PENNSYLVANIA forecastle. Fire brought under control before serious damage resulted. CASSIN rolled over on DOWNES. It was noted by everyone participating in action that after an hour or more heavy thirst was experienced requiring considerable drinking water. This confirms the necessity of having water at all battle stations.

DEWEY Third wave of attack started by dive bombers. DOBBIN and Desdiv One were target with 3 or 4 planes attacking. One bomb hit close aboard starboard quarter and one hit water between HULL and DEWEY astern. No damage. Guns 1 and 2 firing when not blanked by DOBBIN. It is believed that Desdiv ONE destroyed two planes. Ammunition expended; 76 rounds 5", 1300 rounds .50 cal.

BLUE Good sound contact on submarine. Maneuvered to attack and dropped four depth charges. Regained sound contact on same submarine. Dropped two depth charges. Investigated and observed large oil slick and air bubbles rising to surface. It is felt that this submarine was definitely sunk. Obtained third contact on a submarine that was apparently headed for ST. LOUIS, which was at the time heading out on course approximately 150 true, at high speed. Two depth charges dropped, and upon return noticed large oil slick on surface. It is claimed that one, and possibly two, submarines were sunk.

Attack group of 15 VSB's with 1,000 lb. bombs each dispatched to position 30 miles south Barber's Point where numerous reports had been received of enemy carriers and other forces; no contact. CinC informed Comtaskfor EIGHT depended on Pearl Harbor for scouting information. This in order maintain carrier striking group in readiness.

NORTHAMPTON Approximately 15 miles west of Kauai. Section attacked by enemy single seat monoplane, engagement lasting about 20 minutes. Enemy plane made total of seven attacks diving from above or to the side of the scouting section. On all diving attacks presented and exceptionally good target as he squashed down toward the section. Apparent enemy speed 275 miles or better. Enemy plane broke out in smoke and departed. Search continued until completed.

Location of Forces 1200, 7 December 1941: T. F. 8 ENTERPRISE 21-30 160-55; T. F. 12 LEXINGTON. 23-50, 171-15; Subdiv 43 (3 SS), 80 Miles East, coming ready; GUDGEON C-5, Ready; T. F. 1 and 2 less 8 in Pearl; T. F. 3 less 12, areas; Task F 3 rendezvousing with MINNEAPOLIS and 20 Ms southern boundary VI Course 1:15.

TENNESSEE Draft of ship (internal): Fwd. 34' 6, Aft, 35' 10 1/4; Mean 35' 4 l/2". Enemy transport reported 40 miles off Barber's Point. Parachute troops landing on Barber's Point later proved false). After Battle Dressing Station send stretcher party to left gun, turret III, and remove casualties. Three planes on starboard beam coming this way (do not know whether enemy or not) Said planes flying low; apparently, turning away. Organize a crew of about 30 men to relieve men of Turret IV who are fighting fire on water.

Combatships To Cincpac: PENNSYLVANIA Dive bomb hit starboard side frame 86 drydock now flooded. MARYLAND magazines flooded. TENNESSEE fire in wardroom country. OKLAHOMA capsized. WEST VIRGINIA sunk but upright. CALIFORNIA down by the head and heavy list to port probably on bottom. ARIZONA sunk. NEVADA beached off Hospital Point.

----- While GAMBLE conducting depth charge attack off Diamond Head, received three despatches from CinC addressed to ASP. Ships ordered to attack transports reported four miles off Barber's Point. All vessels having departed Pearl Harbor organized as Task Force ONE to report to CTF 8 clearing harbor and to report position, composition, and speed. GAMBLE continued with depth charge attack until contact was lost then proceeded to Barber's Point where no transports were found. Continued westward.

HELENA To Comcrubatfor: Due contamination feed water cannot maintain underway status longer than 8 hours. During this time speed limited to 10 kts. Ready this condition on one hour notice F power for fire control limited to two diesel generators. View condition and to effect repairs recommend letting fires under all boilers die out.

CTF 8 launched 9 VSB's to cover sector 110-200T to 175 miles. One of latter reported contact with surface forces believed enemy including a carrier in position Lat 20-32 Long 158-16 and cruiser Lat 20-32 Long 158-40. Scout reported being attacked by VF's. No further radio contact established with scout. Scout landed later at Kaneohe, reports believed to have been in error.

WASMUTH rigs twin ship moored minesweep with USS ZANE, 400 fathoms of wire between ships, depressors at 5 fathoms, no floats. At 1547 entered Pearl Harbor entrance channel and sweep up channel to gate vessel, where wire parted. At 1620 anchored off Coal Dock and retrieved sweep gear. At l628 underway. At 1635 the Captain returned aboard, Lieutenant Commander Agnew, USN, left and joined TREVER. Returned off harbor entrance and resumed patrol in company with Mindiv 4.

TENNESSEE received one heavy bomb through turret top which did not explode, but put 2 rammers out of commission. Also one bomb hit aft which cracked one 14" gun. Heat from the ARIZONA fire melted and ignited paint in after portion of the second deck which was badly burned out. Ship is now heavily wedged to mooring by reason of the WEST VIRGINIA leaning against her. Steps are being taken to dynamite the mooring to permit the removal of the TENNESSEE. Repairs are proceeding and it is estimated that by 14 December ship will be ready for service less one 14" gun.

HELENA damaged by bomb hit from frame 30, starboard side, opening up side under armor belt for distance of about 50 feet. Number one and two fire rooms and forward engine rooms flooded. Ship is now in drydock #2, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to effect repairs to make seaworthy. It is estimated that new shell and framing will be completed within two weeks and ship will be able to operate with two shafts and with all gun batteries in commission. It is recommended that ship proceed to Mare Island for completion of repairs to hull and machinery.

[3] RALEIGH damaged by one aircraft torpedo which flooded forward half of machinery plant. Also hit by small bomb forward which penetrated three decks and went out ships' side and did not explode. It is proposed to dock the RALEIGH following completion of the HONOLULU to effect underwater repairs to make seaworthy. Recommendations as to whether all repairs to make the ship fully serviceable should be undertaken at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor or a mainland navy yard, will be forwarded later.

CASSIN and DOWNES damaged by bomb in number one drydock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Bomb hit DOWNES exploding her torpedoes warheads and causing serious oil fire. CASSIN was damaged by fire and was knocked off drydock blocking and fell over on DOWNES. DOWNES appears to be total loss except for salvageable parts and materials. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs to CASSIN will be forwarded later.

Position (estimated): 23-45 N, 171-15 W, about 425 miles southeast of Midway and 300 miles West of French Frigate Shoal on a westerly course to land Marine VMSB's on Midway. When attack was made the Task Force was ordered to turn toward Pearl and later directed to intercept the enemy and destroy enemy carriers. INDIANAPOLIS as Task Force THREE, Minron 2 less Mindivs 5 and 6 at Johnston exercising at landing exercises using landing boats. MINNEAPOLIS and Mindiv 5 at sea S. W. of Oahu normal operations. Mindiv 6 in port, with NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO under overhaul.

The Task Forces shown herein, except EIGHT and TWELVE which were on special missions to improve war readiness of Wake and Midway, were in accordance with the organization of the Pacific Fleet which had been effective since 30 April 1941, and revised on 31 October 1941. The Task Forces were operating in accordance with the approved employment schedule of the Fleet and the special tasks assigned. It will be noted that all combatant vessels were assigned to Task Forces. This assignment was in accordance with their war missions and all training was conducted with that in mind

The provisions of the security measures were always followed by ships in the operating areas even to the point of having ready ammunition at the guns. Frequent surprise drills were held by ships in Pearl Harbor, in coordination with Army and distant activities to test the provisions of the security measures against air and submarine attacks on ships in port. Since, however, the times in port had to be devoted to upkeep, and limited recreation periods, and since the intelligence information indicated complete security from any surprise air attack, the provisions of the air security plan were not fully effective in port At the time of the attack, however, provisions had been made and were in effect to provide against sabotage on ships, docks and equipment. And all ships had armed patrols and careful routine inspections of the ships during the entire time in port. In the battleships, two machine guns were always manned and ready and two 5"/25 guns were manned with stand-by crews and 16 rounds of ammunition at each gun.

(d) The first indication of any enemy force in the area was the appearance of a submarine close aboard the ANTARES returning from Canton Island and preparing to enter Honolulu while towing a barge. This submarine was attack by a destroyer of the off-shore patrol which was called by the ANTARES. This was at about 0645. In addition, plane one of VP-14 dropped a bomb on a submarine off the entrance to Pearl. In this connection numerous sonic contacts had been reported in the operating waters close to Pearl during the last six months but no actual visual [5] contacts had been made. In addition no attacks had been made on these suspected submarines because the Navy Department had prohibited such attacks except within the 3 mile limit. When the international situation grew more tense, however, the Commander-in-Chief directed ships to attack submarines suspected to be operating this area, and it was on this authority that the WARD and VP-14 attacked on the morning of 7 December.

(f) While it appeared logical that the attack should come from the northward so that the planes would fly down wind with their loads, no such evidence was available from the nature of the attack. Certain information indicated that carriers or enemy forces were operating to the southward. A direction finder bearing of radio transmissions at 1046 was received to indicate that an enemy force bore 178 from Pearl. This was not a positive indication of an enemy position but did indicate the probability of an enemy carrier to the southward. A message was received from a ship with the MINNEAPOLIS call at 0950 stating that carrier had been sighted. The MINNEAPOLIS was then south of Oahu. At 1010 4 DM's sent a message that they were in area Sail 2 and that two carriers

This information was passed to Task Forces at sea as an indication of probable location of enemy forces In addition, at 1018 the Task Force Commanders were advised that there were only 12 VP's available in Pearl for search and that there was some indication that the enemy was to the northward. They were directed to locate and attack the enemy of unknown composition. Search was instituted at once by Task Force EIGHT who was then somewhat west by south of Pearl. At 1020, 16 VSB from ENTERPRISE loaded with 1000 lb. bombs were launched to search for and attack a reported group of 4 transports off Barber's Point. The origin of the report about the transports is unknown and it probably was enemy deception because surface craft proceeding to attack them were attacked by enemy submarines in that area. Ships that could so cleared the harbor by this time and were organized as a separate Task Force ONE at 1105 and directed to report to Commander Task Force EIGHT to assist in locating and destroying the enemy.

At 1330 a radio direction finder bearing on an enemy frequency and by a ship using the "AKAGI" call was picked up and gave a bearing of 183 from Pearl and another unidentified unit was found to be on bearing 167 from Pearl. This information was passed to the Task Forces at sea and on that information and the supposition that any enemy forces in the area south of Oahu would retire, toward Jaluit, the senior Task Force Commander at sea directed Task Force TWELVE at 1552, to intercept and destroy the enemy. In addition, Task Force ONE which had joined Task Force EIGHT was directed to proceed to search with surface force and attack. The surface force search was also based on a retirement toward Jaluit.

No contacts were made and the enemy was not located, except that 2 planes from the cruiser NORTHAMPTON made contact with an enemy fighter at 1120 just north of NIIHAU and after 20 minutes in spite of the enemy superior speed and gun power succeeded in shooting him down. No report of this attack ever reached the Commander-in-Chief.

From the chart later discovered from enemy planes, shot down there is no indication that any carriers operated to the southward of Oahu. The charts do indicate, however, that the attack was launched from a point about 200 miles to the northward and that the carrier retired to the northward at full speed while waiting planes to return from the attack. (It appears then that the enemy carriers in his area were well beyond the daylight search curve of the planes sent out to find them and therefore were successful in evading all contacts with our air forces in the area).

The search by surface craft carrier aircraft and their ship-based planes to the southward was not successful. It appears probable that the enemy used radio deception by placing a ship to the southward to use deceptive radio calls, to indicate the presence of enemy forces in that area. It may be possible, too, that if enemy forces were in that area that they retired at high speed to the South. Ward beyond the range of our ships and aircraft. [8]

In addition, the planes of VP-21 departed Midway and searched the area from Midway to Johnston and then from Johnston to Pearl Harbor. Six planes of Patwing TWO searched the sector with the median of 220 from Pearl Harbor to a distance of 550 miles. The planes from the ENTERPRISE searched the sector 315 to 270 from the carrier's daylight position.

the Gulf of Mexico. The fact that many Japanese immigrants had settled in California and Mexico made it easier for the Japanese undercover agents. The most effective covers for Japanese agents were the occupations of fishermen and barbers. The technique was to teach the Mexicans to fish scientifically and arrangement were made with the government of Mexico to allow Japanese fishermen to fish on the Mexican coast. One of the tasks set by the Japanese Naval Intelligence was to keep a watch on the US fleet when it was conducting maneuvers off of Southern California.

The Panama Canal was also another prime target for Japanese espionage. There in Panama City, were forty-seven Japanese barbers in the mid-thirties -- all linked to an attractive Japanese girl named Chiyo Morasawa who operated a clothes shop. She regularly collected all the tit-bits of barbers' gossip and, together with photographs of military installations, passed them over to her husband who was a Japanese Navy officer.

Another famous spy network operating in Hawaii was under a Japanese named Commander Itaru Tachibana. Earlier, in 1930, Tachibana had entered the United States and enrolled as a language student at the University of Pennsylvania, but later switched to the University of Southern California and from there worked in a spy network. However, he was arrested by the FBI while trying to recruit ex-navy officers to spy for him in Hawaii.

nevertheless adaptable, versatile, imaginative and effective. He frequented the Shuncho-ro Restaurant which had an excellent view of the harbor. To be more clandestine, the Japanese spy network also used a German named Dr. Keuhn, whose attractive and gregarious daughter Ruth played her full part by making friends with American naval officers at parties and tennis courts. Ruth started a beauty parlor and learned a great deal by listening to the gossip of her clients, mainly U.S. officers' wives. Yoshikawa had an eye for detail and a mass of information was collected, including names, numbers and technical idiosyncrasies of ship movements and transmitted to the Hawaiian Japanese consul. Although American Intelligence officers were aware that the U.S. Naval fleet was being watched by the Japanese, they were skeptical that Japan had any heinous design for Hawaii. Further, Japanese counter intelligence was very effective in confusing American intelligence by getting all sorts of naval information from every Japanese embassy and consulate around the world -- ranging from Stockholm to Cape Town, and from Geneva to Naples as well as that from Hawaii.

arrivals and departures of battles ships and all the minutes were speedily relayed by the Foreign Ministry to Naval Intelligence in Tokyo. When the Pacific war started on December 7, Yoshikawa managed to burn all his code books and any compromising material in his hands before he was interned by the Americans, Dr. Keuhn and Ruth were arrested and so too was Mrs. Keuhn. Though the initial sentences were harsh, all three were later released after the war.

On March 27, 1941, the Japanese liner Nitta Maru nuzzled against Pier 8 near Honolulu's famous Aloha Tower on the Hawaiian island of Oahu. One of the disembarking passengers--a slim, 29-year-old man of medium height, his longish, black hair combed back--received a lei greeting from an official of the Japanese Consulate. Vice Consul Otojiro Okuda guided the young man, whose papers identified him as Tadashi Morimura, through customs and drove him to the two-story consulate on Nuuana Avenue.

His promising career was truncated by a major stomach ailment. Retired after only two years, Yoshikawa was contemplating suicide when the navy offered him a job with its general staff's intelligence division. For the next four years, the young man studied English and pored over everything available on the U.S. Navy and its Pacific Ocean bases. He was told late in 1940 that he was being posted to the American territory of Hawaii. There, posing as junior diplomat Morimura, he was to keep current on the status of the U.S. fleet and its anchorages, reporting his observations to Tokyo by coded telegraph messages. The assignment fit into a plan outlined in January 1941 by Combined Fleet Commander Isoroku Yamamoto. The plan called for an aerial assault on Hawaii as the opening move of a war that seemed inevitable as tensions rose between the United States and Japan. Yoshikawa was to become his country's only military spy in the islands and Yamamoto's most valuable source of current information on Oahu.

Yoshikawa began by familiarizing himself with the principal Hawaiian islands and their military installations, which were concentrated on Oahu. To explore the latter, he frequently relied on a hired cab driven by John Mikami, a Japanese-Hawaiian who often performed chores for the consulate. Other times, the spy used a 1937 Ford chauffeured by Richard Kotoshirodo, a nisei consular clerk. It did not take long for Yoshikawa to scout out the various U.S. Army and Navy bases on central, southern and eastern Oahu. Predictably, the focus of his attention was Pearl Harbor, the nearly landlocked U.S. Pacific Fleet anchorage on the south coast of the island.

When Consul General Kita introduced Yoshikawa to a Japanese-style teahouse in the mountainside Alewa Heights section, just north of downtown Honolulu, the affable intelligence officer knew it would be his favorite operational site. Not only was the teahouse strategically situated but it also fit his penchant for hard drinking and pursuing women.

The Shuncho ro (Spring Tide Restaurant) on Makanani Drive was run by a cooperative woman, a native of his own Shikoku Island, and was staffed by genial geishas. Its intelligence value lay in the view from the second floor. From the front windows, Yoshi-kawa could see Ford Island in the center of Pearl Harbor, only six miles to the west. Just to the left, adjacent to the naval installation, lay the army's Hickam Field. The teahouse conveniently had a telescope or two that enhanced the view.

Yoshikawa wisely did not overuse any one observation post or method as he spied on activities in Pearl Harbor and Hickam airfield. Sometimes, dressed as a laborer, he took a minibus to the cane fields at Aiea to the north of the two bases. From other nearby slopes, he could look down at the submarine facilities in the harbor's Southeast Loch. A pier at Pearl City to the northwest enabled the Japanese operative to view the far side of Ford Island and its airstrip. A close look at the harbor entrance, which might be guarded by anti-submarine nets, eluded him because both sides of the entrance were restricted areas. Without telling them what he was doing with their input, although they surely knew, he used one or more of the consulate's personnel to complement his intelligence gathering.

In keeping with his cover, Yoshikawa avoided illegally entering military bases or stealing classified documents. He shunned cameras and notepads, relying instead on memory. Given American openness, he and his helpers got virtually all the information they needed by legal, though stealthy, means. He supplemented his observations with items of interest gleaned from daily newspapers. Furthermore, U.S. counterintelligence agencies were hampered by laws that prohibited them from probing deeply into the consulate's communications. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence organizations followed leads that led elsewhere.

For example, Captain Irving Mayfield, chief of the naval district intelligence offices, believed that the consulate, despite its presumed involvement in espionage, was not "an important part of the [Japanese spy] net." Telephone taps had provided little of value, since the consular staff assumed that the Americans were eavesdropping. Other factors that hamstrung counterintelligence operations were an American fear of alarming the population and ongoing efforts to secure the loyalty of local ethnic Japanese.

Following a time-consuming process, Yoshikawa gradually recorded the island's patterns of military activity. Since the battleships were moored in double rows along Ford Island's southeast side, torpedoes could be used only against the outboard ones. Most vessels were in port every weekend. Air patrols neglected the northern side of Oahu. These and other observations were written up, encoded and transmitted to Tokyo using, in turn, all the cable companies in Honolulu.

By mid-1941, although his information was not always accurate, Yoshikawa had given the Japanese navy invaluable information for its upcoming surprise attack. He knew the individual American warships by name and whether or not they were in port on a specific day. He also eliminated other sites as potential targets, enabling Yamamoto's planners to focus on Pearl Harbor.

"Your concern over the old whaling port of Lahaina as a possible U.S. anchorage is groundless," the spy reported after a trip to Maui Island, to the southeast. After a glass-bottomed tourist-boat outing with two women co-workers, he described Kaneohe Bay on the windward side of Oahu's Koolau Mountains as too shallow for major fleet units.

American reaction to the growing Axis threat began to give the Honolulu consulate anxious moments, as U.S. authorities clamped down on spies both on the mainland and in Hawaii. Local papers announced that the Honolulu police had established an "espionage bureau" at the request of the FBI. Less constrained than its military counterparts, the FBI also was intensifying its own look at the consulate's 234 employees.

President Franklin Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the United States, closed American ports to Japanese ships and embargoed the sale of petroleum products to Japan. When German and Italian consulates were closed, there was concern that Japanese consulates might be next. That would have dealt a major blow to Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor planning.

By September, Japan's intelligence gatherers had a largely complete general picture of their Oahu targets. What they now needed were constantly updated data pinpointing warship locations, aircraft strength and the like. On September 24, Tokyo's "strictly secret" message No. 83 was received at the Honolulu consulate. It requested ship locations keyed to the five geographical zones into which Japanese naval intelligence had divided the waters of Pearl Harbor.

Washington codebreakers had this revealing request, known as the "bomb plot message," translated within 15 days of its interception.The message was deemed noncritical by the U.S. powers-that-be, however, and was therefore not relayed to military commanders in Hawaii. Yoshikawa and his colleagues, on the other hand, now could have little doubt that their work was feeding plans to attack Pearl Harbor. The consulate's response to the bomb plot message offered suggestions that would refine Tokyo's request and more precisely locate individual targets. This message, too, was intercepted by the Americans--and shrugged off. By this time, Washington was downplaying Japanese subversion in the interests of ongoing diplomatic talks with Tokyo.

In October, he met the man Tokyo had selected to be his successor once the outbreak of war shuttered the consulate. Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn was a Nazi who had moved with his family to Hawaii in 1936 under contract to the Japanese. He was a "sleeper," a long-term agent to be activated when needed. Kuehn was anything but an effective agent--in fact, U.S. counterintelligence already had him on its suspect list--but he was the only one available to fill in at a time when Asian faces might be unwelcome in Hawaii. The letter and package Yoshikawa gave Kuehn contained, respectively, an operational message and $14,000 in working funds. Kuehn's vacation at Axis expense was over in more ways than one; he was arrested shortly after the Japanese attack.

In late October, the liner Taiyo Maru left Yokohama for Honolulu in a limited relaxation of the shipping freeze. Aboard were three Japanese naval officers ordered to make observations along the route laid out for the attack force, verify the consulate's information, and obtain new data. Although other personnel maintained a brisk traffic between the consulate and the trio on the docked liner during a five-day period, Yoshikawa kept away for security reasons.

Nevertheless, the brunt of the new information requirements fell on his shoulders. He worked nearly around the clock to prepare responses, which included maps covering various aspects of Oahu's military dispositions. Despite close U.S. surveillance measures that kept them aboard ship, the visiting officers returned home satisfied that they had successfully completed their mission.

The intelligence-collecting pace paralleled the increased tension that came with a November 5 Tokyo imperial conference decision to "prepare a surprise attack" on Pearl Harbor for Sunday, December 7, Oahu time. Throughout the month, requests for updated information and replies flashed between Japan and Hawaii. While Yoshikawa and his helpers raced around Oahu, the Kido Butai, Japan's attack force, assembled and steamed eastward into the North Pacific. Soon, Yoshikawa was sending biweekly "ships in harbor" reports to Japan for relay to the approaching task force. Late in the month, the consulate was ordered to destroy its high-level codes and all accumulated secret papers. On December 1, with Emperor Hirohito present, the Japanese Privy Council officially authorized the Pearl Harbor action. The next day, Tokyo flashed a green light to the Kido Butai to proceed with the attack.

On December 5, Yoshikawa asked cabbie Mikami to drive him west along a road that has since been replaced by the Moanalua Freeway to a point north of Pearl Harbor. From there, he watched the last of the Pacific Fleet's three aircraft carriers put to sea with her escort of cruisers and destroyers. While the departure of USS Lexington came too late to affect Japan's war plans, the absence of the carriers on December 7 was to have a decisive effect on America's ability to eventually wrest the offensive from Japan. Yoshikawa was asked if the moored U.S. ships were protected by anti-aircraft balloons and anti-torpedo nets. His negative report on these contained a direct reference to "a surprise attack," a slip that was caught by American codebreakers, but not translated until the day after the air raid.

At midafternoon on December 6, Yoshikawa climbed into Mikami's taxi for what turned out to be his final reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor from the Pearl City pier. Back at the consulate, he coordinated his report with Kita, then saw that the encoded message went to the RCA communications office for transmittal to Tokyo. The Japanese foreign ministry received it shortly afterward and passed it to the navy general staff for forwarding to the attack force. According to Yoshikawa's reporting, supplemented by coded transpacific telephone conversations with at least one other operative, everything seemed favorable for Sunday's mission. Late that Saturday, Oahu time, the latest target information was in the hands of the Kido Butai, now churning due south toward Oahu.

The Japanese consular personnel, not having been forewarned by Tokyo, nervously gathered together as the noise of the surprise raid reached them that fateful Sunday, December 7. Kita and Okuda were dressed for a golfing date. Yoshikawa had been in his cottage. An enterprising Honolulu journalist visiting the consulate for comments provided the first confirmation of what was happening. At midday, local policemen drove past posted guards into the driveway at the rear of the consulate and took over the building. They interrupted a last-minute burning of documents. Shortly afterward, Mikami pulled up in his taxi and asked a policeman to inform the consul general and vice consul that he had arrived to drive them to the golf course. Mikami was told that his fares would not be coming out to play that day.

Yoshikawa and his colleagues remained inside their workplace for more than a week. Driven to a Coast Guard vessel, they were then transported to San Diego. In March 1942, they were placed in an Arizona camp holding numerous interned nisei. Yoshikawa later described this experience as "a cruel joke. You see, I couldn't trust them [Japanese-Americans] in Hawaii to help us. They were loyal to the United States." The spy and his companions ultimately were exchanged for American diplomats being held in Japan. During his internment, no outsider learned Yoshikawa's true identity.

Back in his homeland, Yoshikawa married and continued working for naval intelligence until the end of the war. Fearful of arrest when U.S. troops occupied Japan in 1945, he fled into the countryside and posed as a Buddhist monk. He returned to his wife and two children after the occupation, not telling his story to an American audience until 1960. He was a bitter man, unable to earn a living and forced to rely on his wife's insurance sales for subsistence. His government gave him neither honors nor pension. The aging Pearl Harbor spy was left to ask, "Why has history cheated me?"